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BE YOND HIGH HOPES AND
UNMET EXPECTAT ONS
JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORMS IN THE STATES
Public debate on state judicial elections versus merit selection spans more than a century. The empirical
evidence suggests there is no "best" system for selecting judges; all systems have advantages and
disadvantages. The relative merit of the various systems depends on the goals we wish to maximize.
by REBECCA D. GILL
The scholarly debate about how to
select state judges has been ongoing
for decades; the public debate on the
issue spans more than a century.
Proponents on each side seem con-
fident that their preferred method of
judicial selection is the best. Reform-
ers have argued that "judicial elec-
tions deserve the limelight in the
variety show of threats to judicial
independence."' Defenders of judicial
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elections have countered that judi-
cial reformers are "waging war on
democratic processes and the rights
of citizens to maintain control over
government."2 The empirical evi-
dence to date, however, has largely
resulted in a draw. The more we
learn about the actual performance
of these systems, the more difficult it
becomes to declare one or the other
system the winner. The purpose of
this article is not to settle this debate,
but neither will I shy away from it.
Instead, I discuss what we currently
know about judicial selection in the
The author would like to thank Mary S. Wood
for invaluable research assistance.
1. Charles G. Geyh, Whyludicial Elections Stink,
64 OHIo ST. L.J. 43, 51 (2003).
2. Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, IN
DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 139 (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2009).
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American states and what it means
for the future.
How States Choose Judges
At the heart of it, there are really just
two main mechanisms for choos-
ing and retaining judges. appoint-
ment and election.' The large variety
of systems in use in the American
states comes from differences in who
does the appointing or electing. This
is important, of course, because the
decisions judges make "reflect both
the process by which the judges are
chosen and the values of those who
choose them." A place on the bench
is a desirable job; a judgeship is one
of the most secure political positions
there is, and it is highly prestigious.'
Attorneys are also attracted to the
bench by certain intangible benefits,
such as the opportunity to reform the
judicial system and a sense of per-
sonal and professional accomplish-
ment. 6 As a result, often there is a
sizeable pool of attorneys interested
in becoming judges. States need to
determine how to select judges from
this list of potential candidates.
Early on, most American states
chose their judges through appoint-
ment by the governor or the legis-
lature. The resulting judges often
served for life. These appointment
systems fell out of favor in the nine-
teenth century. Of those states that
maintained appointive systems,
the tenure of the judges was gener-
ally reduced to a relatively short
term of office. In order to stay on
the bench, judges needed to be reap-
pointed by the legislature or the gov-
ernor. Several states currently use
appointive systems. Of these, many
have instituted a judicial nomination
3. Henry J. Abraham, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS:
AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE
(Cambridge, UK: Oxford University Press 3rd
ed., 1975).
4. Robert A. Carp, et al., JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
AMERICA 113 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press 9th
ed., 2014).
5. Henry R. Glick, COURTS, POLITICS, AND
JUSTICE (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1983).
6. Mary L Volcansek, Why Lawyers Become
Judges, 62 JUDICATURE 166 (1978).
7. Supra n. 5 at 73.
8. Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Mis-
souri Non-Partisan Court Plan: The Least Political
Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 Mo. L.
REv. 711, 713 (2009).
committee to select and screen can-
didates for the bench. Some of these
systems are statutory, while others
are the result of executive orders
enacted by governors.
By the middle of the nineteenth
century, the populist sentiment asso-
ciated with the Jacksonian Era led
many states to abandon appointive
systems in favor of partisan elec-
tions. These systems generally allow
each political party to select its
own candidate through a primary
process. The candidates then square
off against each other in contested
elections, where the candidates are
identified by party affiliation on the
ballot. Although these partisan elec-
tions had the potential to be highly
competitive and acrimonious, his-
torically this was rarely the case.
Partisan elections were generally
relatively low-key affairs, with few
candidates willing to take on incum-
bent judges.
Part of the impetus for the move
to partisan elections was to give
judges independence from the other
branches of government. Many pop-
ulist reformers were disappointed
with the results of this reform.
Instead of being beholden to the
political elites who appointed them,
these new elected judges were often
beholden to the party bosses who
essentially secured their positions.
At the turn of the twentieth century,
the progressive movement sought
new reforms to rid the judiciary of
these ties to partisan politics. The
result was the nonpartisan election.
These elections were quite similar to
the partisan ones, except that judges
were selected in nonpartisan pri-
maries, and their names appeared
without the party designation on
the ballot. The hope was that voters
would select judges on the basis of
their qualifications and suitability
for office instead of their party affili-
ation.
When nonpartisan elections failed
to deliver the high quality, depo-
liticized courts the reformers had
hoped for, a new system was created
that uses a combination of features
to maximize judicial quality while
minimizing the influence of political
concerns on the judiciary. This plan is
called the merit plan, or alternatively
the Missouri Plan after the first state
to enact it. The merit plan for select-
ing state judges has been "one of the
key features of judicial reform" since
the early twentieth century.7 In this
plan, a nominating commission made
up of lawyers and laypeople selects
and evaluates potential judicial can-
didates. They narrow the field down
to a short list of candidates, which is
presented to the governor. The gov-
ernor appoints one of the candidates
from the list to a short term in office.
After this, the judge faces the voters
in an uncontested retention election.
In most merit plan states, the judge
must get at least 50 percent plus one
vote in favor of retention in order to
stay on the bench. The incumbent
judge then stands for periodic reten-
tion elections.
The four main types of judi-
cial selection systems are general
models. Each state has its own
unique version. Because few states
fit the models exactly, there are
almost as many ways to classify state
judicial selection systems in America
as there are researchers classify-
ing them. Figure 1 is just one way of
categorizing them. Despite all of the
caveats at the bottom of the chart, it
remains an oversimplified account-
ing of the status quo in the states. I
have arranged the states based on
the overall character of their selec-
tion systems, understanding that the
details of many state systems would
qualify for inclusion in several differ-
ent categories.
For example, many people would
place states like Connecticut in the
merit plan column because the gov-
ernor uses a nomination commis-
sion to recommend candidates for
appointment. I call this an appointive
system, however, because the judge
is retained through reappointment
instead of through retention elec-
tions. I take retention elections to be
"an essential element" of the merit
selection system.a I also have listed
Michigan and Ohio under the parti-
san election category even though
the candidate's party affiliation
does not appear on the ballot; I do
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this because judges in both of these
states are subject to partisan prima-
ries, which makes them quite similar
to partisan elections.9
By my count, 17 states currently
use the classic merit system that gen-
erally includes a nominating com-
mission, gubernatorial appointment,
and retention elections. This is a
plurality. Nonpartisan elections are
used in 13 states, while nine states
use at least one partisan election
in their selection process. An addi-
tional 11 states plus the District of
Columbia use some type of appoint-
ment system.
But Figure 1 is just a snapshot in
time of a dynamic process of reform.
Not too long ago, many scholars
were convinced that the momentum
was on the side of the merit plan.
One author in the 1980s wrote that
the chances are "overwhelming that
any state that decides to change its
method of choosing judges will move
to the Missouri [P]lan, not to any
other selection system."o Since then,
only about half of the states that
have changed systems have chosen
the merit plan.
The trend of formal judicial selec-
tion reforms since 1900 is repre-
sented in Figure 2. In this chart, I
have created hybrid categories rep-
resenting modifications of existing
selection systems that fall short of
wholesale adoption of other exist-
ing systems. This helps to illustrate
the fact that many states were moti-
vated enough to make substantial
changes to their selection systems,
but declined to adopt the popular
reform of the day. While many
states had moved from appointive
systems to partisan elections in the
Jacksonian Era, a good number of
Eastern states kept the appointment
systems.
Mississippi was an early adopter
of partisan elections, perhaps in
part due to its exuberant embrace of
Andrew Jackson's governing philoso-
phy. The state abandoned legislative
appointment in favor of partisan
elections in 1832; it was the first
state to do so. The state moved back
to an appointment system-this time
by the governor-with the passage
Partisan Nonpartisan Merit Plan Appointment
Election Election
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Michigant Kentucky
New Mexico§ Minnesota
Ohiot Mississippi
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Florida*
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North Dakota Maryland*
Oregon
Washington
Wisconsin
Missouri*
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Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Maine
Massachusetts**
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New Jersey
New York*
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South Carolina
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South Dakota*
Tennessee*
Utah
Wyoming
System used for appellate courts, with other system used in at least some trial courts
t Uses avariant of the merit plan which includes retention elections? Partisan primary for at least some of the judgeships
§ Hybrid system with partisan elections first and retention elections for subsequent terms.
** Does not require reappointment; t rm for life or until mandatory retirement age
Data derived from the American Judicature Society's "Judicial Selection in the States" (http://www.judicialselection.us).
of the Reconstruction Constitution
in 1868, just as the trend toward par-
tisan elections was gaining momen-
tum elsewhere. The movement we
see in Figure 2 is Mississippi moving
back to partisan elections in 1914.
The rest of the top section of the
chart shows the general trend away
from Jacksonian-Era partisan elec-
tions toward the reform favored by
the Progressives: nonpartisan elec-
tions. The other major exception to
this trend is the 1921 repeal of Penn-
sylvania's 1913 change to nonparti-
san elections. In advance of the 1940
enactment of the first merit plan,
California moved from nonpartisan
elections to what might be consid-
ered a precursor to the merit plan.
This system initially selects judges
by gubernatorial appointment; for
subsequent terms, the judges stand
for retention elections. In the time
between 1940 and 1970, most states
making changes to their election
systems opted for nonpartisan elec-
tions instead of the newly minted
merit plan. However, the 1970s saw
a large movement toward the merit
plan; in that decade alone, nine of the
14 judicial selection system changes
were to the merit plan. Since the
merit plan was first adopted, only
Tennessee has abandoned it in favor
9. Bert Brandenburg & Rachel Paine Caufield,
Ardent Advocates, 93 JUDICATURE 79 (2009).
10 Supra n. 5 at 76. [emphasis removed].
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of another system."
It appears that the momentum
toward the merit plan has stalled.
Despite enthusiastic, aggressive
campaigns in favor of the merit plan
in a number of states, voters appear
to be increasingly unwilling to cede
their power to select and retain
judges through competitive elec-
tions. Americans hold seemingly
conflicting opinions about what they
want out of their judicial system.
A 2008 poll found that, while 55
percent of respondents think judges
should be elected, the vast majority
of respondents were concerned about
the effect of electoral campaigns and
fundraising on the impartiality of
state judges." This apparent inco-
herence makes more sense in light
of the inherent tensions between the
need for judicial independence and
accountability.
We must go back to Alexander
Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson
to discover the roots of the debate
about the proper balance of judicial
accountability and judicial inde-
pendence." This debate remains a
central feature of the current debate
about judicial selection systems.
Much of the divide between advo-
cates of traditional elections and
advocates for appointments or merit-
based reform hinges on different
assumptions about the appropriate
levels of accountability and indepen-
dence. 4 There is a long tradition of
pessimism when it comes to finding
an acceptable balance." How do we
choose among all possible judicial
selection options? As one scholar
recently put it, "[t]he answer logi-
cally turns on which selection option
under consideration optimizes 'good'
independence that enables judges to
follow due process, administer prag-
matic justice, and uphold the rule of
law, while minimizing 'bad' indepen-
dence that liberates judges to disre-
gard these same three objectives."' 6
Institutional legitimacy is particu-
larly important for courts, as this
is one of the few sources of politi-
cal capital for these "weak institu-
tions."' Courts have a tradition of
establishing the acceptability of their
role in making politically charged
decisions by emphasizing the dif-
ferences between judges and the
politicians.' This focus on the dif-
ferent role of the judge implies the
importance of impartiality to the
legitimacy of the courts. By jealously
guarding the independence of the
judges on the bench, impartiality is
maintained. Indeed, the impetus for
each of the major reform efforts out-
lined above was to protect judicial
independence."
The job of the judge is certainly dif-
ferent enough from that of a legisla-
tor to require the freedom to diverge
from public opinion to some extent;
this is the only way to facilitate
the protection of due process and
justice.2 0 The independence of our
judiciary-as well as the perception
that our judiciary is independent-is
critical for the protection of our gov-
ernment against "greed, mendacity,
brutality, moral arrogance, prejudice,
and petty hatreds."21 But judges do
engage in policymaking, especially
in state courts of last resort. Calls
that judges be insulated from the
wishes of the community run afoul of
the idea that the rule of law requires
policymakers to be accountable to
the citizens for their actions. Some
argue that the role of the state judge
is qualitatively different from that of
a federal judge, who is well protected
from accountability.22 As such, it may
be more appropriate to encourage
judicial accountability "at the state
level where we would expect a close
connection between public prefer-
11. Tennessee's failed ballot proposal was in
1977. The remaining states are Illinois (1970),
Nevada (1972, 1988, 2010), Ohio (1987), Oregon
(1978, 2006), and Pennsylvania (1969). Tennes-
see and five other states have had at least one
failed ballot measure attempting to move to the
merit plan.
12. American Bar Association Press Release,
Public Dislikes Partisan Political Influence, Special
Interest Money, in Judicial Selection, ABA Now,
Oct. 21. 2008.
13. Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Indepen-
dence, and the Selection of State Judges: The
Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 S.W. L.J. 31
(1986).
14. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Selection Recon-
sidered: A Plea for Radical Moderation, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 623 (2012).
15. Glenn R. Winters, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND
TENURE: SELECTED READINGS (American Judica-
ture Society, 1973).
16. Supra n. 14 at 630.
17. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the
ences and public policy.""
The story of former California
Chief Justice Rose Bird is the classic
example of the need for judicial inde-
pendence. Appointed in 1977, Rose
Bird, the first woman to sit on the
California Supreme Court, was the
target of criticism.24 During her time
on the bench, she heard 61 death
penalty appeals, and she voted to
overturn every single one of them.
Conservative interest groups, dis-
pleased by her decisions unfriendly
to business interests, capitalized
on the dissonance between Bird's
stance on the death penalty and the
widespread public support for the
practice.25 She withstood a blister-
ing campaign against her in her first
retention election and a number of
recall attempts. She was ultimately
ousted from the bench after being
targeted by one of the most expen-
sive and notorious judicial cam-
paigns in history.
But some argue that Chief Justice
Bird and the rest of the California
Supreme Court had "sowed some of
the seed of [their] own undoing" by
reading into California's Constitu-
tion "values not widely shared by the
people of California."26 Her removal
was an exercise in holding account-
able judges who, "although they may
not have violated a judicial canon or
engaged in conduct that would result
in impeachment, have displayed a
continuous course of conduct that
shows a disregard for precedence
and the law."' 7
Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy
Theory and "New Style" Judicial Campaigns, 102
AM. POuT. Scl. REV. 59, 61 (2008).
18. Id.
19. Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29
FORD. URB. L.J. 851 (2002).
20. Supra n. 14.
21. Paul D. Carrington, judicial Independence
and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 61 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 79, 80
(1998).
22. Supra n. 2.
2 3. Id., at 2.
24. Todd S. Purdum, Rose Bird, Once Califor-
nia's Chieffustice, Is Dead at 63, New York Times,
Dec. 6. 1999.
25. Tom Wicker, A Naked Power Grab, see Id.
Sep. 14. 1986.
26. Supra n. 21, at 86.
27. Jeffrey Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Prin-
ciples inJudicial Selection and their Application to
a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORD.
URB. L.J. 125, 135 (2007).
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As the Bird example implies, there
is a need to dig deeper into the ideas
of independence and accountability.
Specifically, we need to make two
important distinctions: one about
who judges should be accountable to
or independent from, the other about
what judges should be accountable
for (and, conversely, what should
be protected from accountability).
Usually, when we think of account-
ability for judges, we think of
accountability to the electorate as
secured through periodic competi-
tive elections." Appointive systems
are generally thought to maximize
independence, but this may not be
entirely accurate; opponents of such
systems argue that "appointment by
a political executive contains even
worse features of political behold-
enness than election."" The differ-
ence here, of course, is to whom the
judges are accountable. Each type of
accountability is different in nature,
so it is necessary to address them
separately.
Accountable To Whom?
Other Branches of Government
Politicians have long realized the
importance of staffing the courts.
These positions have traditionally
been used as patronage, whereby a
politician or a political party could
"reward [their] supporters with
respected government positions."s0
Unlike the federal judicial selection
system, where the initial appoint-
ment stage is the last official point
where the other branches can influ-
ence the selection of judges, most
states with appointive systems
require judges to be reappointed
28. Melinda Gann Hall, Competition as
Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL,
FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007).
29. Supra n. 3, at 31.
30. Supra n. 5, at 74.
31. The exceptions to this rule are Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island;
none of these states require reappointment. See
Figure 1,
32. Supra n. 5, at 81.
33. For lower court judges, the Governor uses
a nominating commission to narrow his choices.
34. Former Governor Mitt Romney issued an
executive order directing the nomination com-
mission to provide him with a list of dossiers for
potential candidates with the names scrubbed.
WE NEED TO MAKE TWO DISTINCTIONS:
WHOM JUDGES SHOULD BE
ACCOUNTABLE TO, AND FOR WHAT
JUDGES SHOULD BE ACCOUNTABLE.
in order to keep their positions.3 1
Appointive systems shift account-
ability away from the public and to
the elites in government creating
indirect ties between the judges and
both the political parties and the
voters.
Appointive systems do well at pro-
tecting the independence of judges
from the people. The vicissitudes of
public opinion are muted as they are
filtered through the political elites
who, for many appointed judges,
are former colleagues. Indeed, the
most common career trajectory for
judges in appointive systems leads
through the state legislature. This is
true even in gubernatorial appoint-
ment systems-including those used
for interim appointments in elective
systems. This kind of appointment
"normally involves a web of political
relationships between the governor
and other state and local political
officials."3 2 In appointive systems
that require periodic reappointment,
however, the judges enjoy little inde-
pendence from the legislature or the
governor.
Governor Deval Patrick as continued this process
of blind review. However, neither governor has
applied the blind review process to appointments
to the Supreme Judicial Court. See Martin W.
Healey, A GUIDE TO THE MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROCESS: THE MAKING OF A JUDGE
(Massachusetts Bar Association 2nd ed. 2012).
35. Sanford Levinson, Identifying "Indepen-
dence," 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297, 1302 (2006).
36. John Ferejohn, Independent judges, Depen-
dent judiciary: Explaining judicial Independence,
72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 355 (1999).
37. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges
Strategic Too?, 58 1589 (2009).
38. Stephen J. Choi, et al., Professionals or
Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 290 (2007).
For example, the Massachusetts
system is one of the most protective
ofjudicial independence overall. Mas-
sachusetts uses something akin to
the federal system of nomination and
confirmation and the resulting term
is until the mandatory retirement
age of 70." But even this system does
not secure complete independence
from the political branches. Judges
in the lower courts must catch the
eye of the judicial nominating com-
mission and win confirmation by the
legislature in order to be elevated to
the Supreme Judicial Court.3 4 Like
lower federal court judges, they
"in effect campaign for promotion
by issuing decisions, and writing
opinions, designed to appeal to the
'judge-pickers.""' In addition, these
judges may be relatively independent
individually, but we can still think of
the life-appointed judiciary as being
dependent in that it "is unable to
do its job without relying on some
other institution or group."" It is
this lack of independence from the
political branches of government
that helped to spur the movement
toward partisan elections. Recent
evidence validates these concerns.
Appointed judges facing reappoint-
ment act strategically. They rule
in favor of litigants from the other
branches of government at much
higher rates than elected judges,
especially as their reappointment
date approaches. 7 Some scholars
have found evidence that appointed
judges are no more independent
from public opinion than are elected
judges." On issues important to the
other branches of government, they
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may be less independent than elected
judges." The pressure may be stron-
ger for appointed judges to conform
to the wishes of the other branches
than for elected judges to bend to
the will of the people. The empirical
evidence shows that politicians who
select judges hold them accountable.
Therefore voters have a hard time
keeping up with the outcomes of all
but the most highly publicized and
sensationalized cases.40 In addition,
the individual voter rarely has a per-
sonal stake in any cases before the
courts. By contrast, political elites
are much more likely to be following
the intricacies of the judges' work.
They are also more likely to have a
professional stake in any number of
cases before the courts.4 ' Account-
ability to politicians may not shield
appointed judges from additional
public pressure. Appointing judges
is sometimes touted as a solution
to protect judicial independence; it
likely does not provide as much insu-
lation as we might think.
The Voters
We generally think of elective
systems as providing unmatched
judicial accountability to the voters.
Research shows that voters expect
a degree of political accountability
from judges, and accountability does
not necessarily damage the legiti-
macy of the courts as institutions.42
judicial elections are "democracy-
enhancing institutions" that serve
to "create a valuable nexus between
citizens and the bench."4 3 In elec-
tive systems, "the political and
judicial processes are...inexorably
intertwined,"4 4 causing problems for
judges who do not represent a con-
stituency as other elected officials
do. 45
There is agreement between
reformers and supporters of elec-
tions that some level of account-
ability to the people is desirable.
The conventional argument is that
contested elections are the most
efficient way to hold judges account-
able to the public." Elective systems
allow the voters to choose judges
who agree with public sentiment on
important political and legal issues
like the death penalty47 and abor-
tion.48 There is also circumstantial
evidence that elected judges follow
the wishes of their constituents
more reliably than other types of
judges. Overall, litigation rates are
lower where judges are elected sug-
gesting that electoral pressure will
reduce uncertainty about likely judi-
cial decisions.4 9 But litigation rates
in a subset of case types are higher,
including employment discrimina-
tion claims, again suggesting that
plaintiffs have greater confidence in
the popular pro-employee disposi-
tion of elected judges and a greater
expectation of accountability."
Partisan elections often are
thought to be better than nonpar-
tisan elections at securing judicial
accountability, but the evidence is far
from clear. Some studies have sug-
gested that partisan-elected judges
are less likely to dissent in contro-
versial cases." Other studies show
that nonpartisan elections do pres-
sure judges to confront the wishes
of the public on salient issues. 2 In
fact, nonpartisan judges may be
more influenced by public opinion on
controversial issues than partisan
judges." This may be related to the
fact that nonpartisan elections are
not as different in practice as they
seem on paper. Often, party involve-
ment in nonpartisan elections is sig-
nificant,14 helping voters glean the
party affiliation of the nominally
nonpartisan candidates.
The existence of partisan cues is
39. Supra n. 37.
40. Press Release American Bar Association,
Poll: Confidence in Judiciary Eroded by Judges'
Need to Raise Campaign Money, (Aug. 12. 2002).
41. Supra n. 37.
42. Supra n. 17.
43. Supra n. 2, at 2.
44. Supra n. 4, at 113.
45. Supra n. 14.
46. Supra n. 5.
47, Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial
Selection Methods and Capital Punishment in
the American States, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE:
THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J.
Streb ed. 2007).
48. Richard P. Caldarone, et al., Nonpartisan
Elections and DemocraticAccountability: An Anal-
ysis ofState Supreme CourtAbortion Decisions, 29
J. POLT. 560 (2009).
49. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The
Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4
AM. L. & EcoN. REv. (2002).
not as problematic in today's judi-
cial elections as it was in the past.
The Jacksonian-Era partisan elec-
tions yielded judges whom the public
viewed as incompetent stooges of the
political party bosses. Today the role
of the political party in vetting and
promoting candidates is different.
Party bosses have given way to party
primaries, diminishing the ability of
party leaders to choose candidates
unilaterally. This characteristic dis-
tinguishes today's judicial elections
from their historical counterpart
that once spurred the Progressives'
push for nonpartisan elections.
In the merit plan, the account-
ability mechanism is the reten-
tion election. The role of the voters
in retention elections has been
described as "very small and gen-
erally insignificant."" The reten-
tion election is intended to limit
accountability by making it decid-
edly difficult to remove any but the
most egregiously terrible judges.6
However, recent empirical evidence
suggests that retention elections
no longer protect judges from pres-
sure to conform to the wishes of the
electorate on hot-button issues like
abortion." The public has very little
information save for whatever they
learn from advertising campaigns
that are sometimes waged against
judges who buck public opinion.
Judges facing retention have a strong
incentive to avoid being targeted by
these campaigns.
Critics of the merit plan complain
50. Timothy Besley & A. Abigail Payne, Impli-
mentation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does
Judicial Selection Matter?, 15 see Id., at 212
(2013).
51. Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence
in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes and a
Case Study, 49 J. POLIT. 1117 (1987).
52. Charles H. Franklin, Behavioral Factors
Affecting Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDE-
PENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCI-
PLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry
Friedman eds., 2002).
53. Supra n. 48.
54. Matthew J. Streb, Partisan Involvement in
Partisan and Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL,
FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007).
55. Supra n. 5, at 85.
56. Supra n. 14.
57. Brandice Canes-Wrone, et al.,Judicial Inde-
pendence and Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 211 (2012).
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that retention elections are insuf-
ficient for promoting accountability.
Despite several high-profile defeats
for incumbent judges in reten-
tion elections, the vast majority of
judges are retained. The affirmative
retention vote has drifted slightly
downward since the 1960s, but has
remained high and relatively stable
since then."' As of 2006, in "only 56 of
the 6,306 judicial retention elections
were judges not retained."9 Reten-
tion elections show a "pronounced
tendency against incumbent defeat
relative to other types of elections."60
A study of state supreme court elec-
tions from 1980 to 2000 showed that
incumbents' defeat rates were 23
percent in partisan elections, seven
percent in nonpartisan elections, and
only two percent in retention elec-
tions.61 The defeat rates for partisan
and nonpartisan elections in inter-
mediate appellate courts differed
little between 2000 and 2005-they
are seven percent and nine percent,
respectively-but only two of 524
judges facing retention elections
were defeated during this same time
span.62
Some merit plan states, like Illi-
nois, have tried to combat these high
retention rates by setting superma-
jority requirements for retention.
After an initial partisan election,
incumbent judges stand for uncon-
tested retention elections. However,
Illinois requires a 60 percent affir-
mative vote to win. About half of all
incumbents defeated in retention
elections between 1964 and 2006
were from Illinois; only one of the
29 judges defeated in Illinois failed
58. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Reten-
tion Elections, 1964-2007, 90 JUDICATURE 208(2007).
59. Id, at 210.
60. Supra n. 28, at 183.
61. Id., at 177.
62. Matthew J. Streb, et al., Contestation, Com-
petition, and the Potential for Accountability in
Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 91 JuDI-
CATURE 70, 77 (2007).
63. Larry Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention
Elections, 1964-2007, 90 see Id., at 208.
64. Melinda Gann Hall, Voluntary Retirements
from State Supreme Courts: Assessing Democratic
Pressures to Relinquish the Bench, 63 J. PoLIT.
(2001).
65. Supra n. 38.
66. Supra n. 28.
67. Supra n. 8.
to get a 50 percent affirmative vote
total.6'
Retention rates tell only part of
the story. Merit plan judges, at least
at the state supreme court level,
respond to eroding support by retir-
ing in lieu of standing for retention.6 1
Thus the affirmative vote totals do
not reflect the true level of account-
ability retention elections provide-
a judge who declines to stand for
retention will not be counted among
the ousted merit plan judges.
Each of the judicial selection
systems used in the states pro-
vides at least some accountability to
voters, even in appointive systems. 6'
Partisan elections yield more com-
petition in state supreme court
races than nonpartisan elections,
making it easier for voters to remove
judges. 6 6 The differences between
nonpartisan and partisan elections
are smaller for lower courts. The
lowest incumbent defeat rate by far
is for retention elections. Although
these judges may not act as though
they are more independent than
other judges, voters
them from office.
Published by
the American
Judicature Society
in 2012, "Inside
Merit Selection"
reports on the
largest-ever
survey ofjudicial
nominating
commissioners
on the dynamics
and procedures
of merit selection
systems in the
states,
rarely remove
Quality of Performance
Supporters of the merit plan argue
that low non-retention rates are,
in part, a function of the initial
merit-based process. The nominat-
ing commission system focuses on
qualifications instead of politics, and
the low non-retention rate is a con-
sequence of the selection of mostly
high-quality judges in the first place.6 7
That good judges remain on the bench
does not demonstrate a lack of judi-
cial accountability, especially if one
believes that judges should not be
removed for reasons other than their
competence on the bench.
This leads to the second major
question in the independence-
accountability debate: For what
should judges be held accountable?
As illustrated earlier, there is general
consensus that judges need to be
held accountable for at least some
types of behavior. Indeed, some
judges need to be removed from the
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bench, whether for reasons of utter
incompetence, corruption, or other
unethical behavior. Of course, the
more independence judges have, the
less simple a task it is to remove even
the very worst offenders.
There are mechanisms outside of
the selection and retention provi-
sions of selection systems that help
to maintain the quality of the bench.
Some states have chosen to enforce
a mandatory retirement age on
their state judges. The assumption
implicit in these requirements is that
it is desirable to remove older judges
from the bench once they reach a
particular age. Often, this means that
elderly judges are deemed "too old
and unfit to serve" on the bench after
a certain age, usually age 70.68
Nearly all states have a mechanism
for impeaching judges who have com-
mitted crimes," though judges are
rarely removed using this process.70
Most states have created special
ethics or disciplinary commissions
that are charged with reviewing evi-
dence and making determinations
about allegations of unethical behav-
ior. These institutions "are designed
to establish standards and ethical
guidelines for judicial elections and
monitor whether candidates comply
with those practices."' Unfortu-
nately, these commissions are largely
seen as weak and ineffective, espe-
cially when they are underfunded. 72
Still, disciplinary commissions can
remove those judges who have com-
mitted crimes or who have other-
wise violated the public trust in
significant ways.
While helpful, judicial disciplin-
ary mechanisms are an insufficient
condition for ensuring a competent
bench. It is important to establish a
higher standard for judicial quality
than just failing to break the law.
Discipline commissions and manda-
tory retirement cannot provide this
service; we must rely on the reten-
tion component of the judicial selec-
tion system to remove judges whose
poor skills on the bench fall outside
the jurisdiction of judicial discipline
committees.
An important rationale for adopt-
ing the merit plan is the claim that
the system of nomination commis-
sions will do a superior job of vetting
judges and choosing the highest
quality candidates for the bench."
Potential candidates are evaluated
on the basis of their legal skills,
not their political credentials, as is
common in the elective systems.14
The lawyers on these commissions
play an important role in this regard,
as they "are most familiar with the
skills, experience, and personal-
ity characteristics necessary for a
qualified judge."7 In addition, they
are much more likely to have profes-
sional relationships with members
of the community who would meet
these standards.
The hope of reformers was that
the use of nonpartisan, disinterested
nominating commissions would
remove political considerations from
the process. While voters at large
cannot reasonably be expected to
comb through the r6sumbs of poten-
tial candidates and compare their
relative merits, nominating com-
missions can. However, wherever
the allocation of positions of politi-
cal power is at stake, removing poli-
tics from the process is not easy to
accomplish, as early evaluations of
the merit system attest.
The politics involved in nominat-
ing commissions is different quali-
tatively, and perhaps quantitatively,
than what is involved in picking a
judge in a contested election. Most
of the more nakedly political initial
selection systems motivate the
selectors to choose judges who will
68. Supra n. 4, at 111.
69. The exceptions are Hawaii, Oregon, Wash-
ington, and the District of Columbia.
70. Only one state judge has been removed
from office through impeachment in the last
15 years-Associate Justice Rolf Larsen of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See American
judicature Society, Methods of Removing State
judges, American Judicature Society (2012),
available at www.ajs.org/ethics.
71. Matthew J. Streb & Brian Frederick, Judi-
cial Reform and the Future ofJudicial Elections,
in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL,
FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELEC-
TIONs 211, (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007).
72. Joathan Abel, Testing Three Commonsense
Intiutions aboutjudicial Conduct Commissions, 64
STAN. L. REV. 1021(2012).
73. Supra n. 5.
74. Supra n. 54.
75. Supra n. 5.
76. Richard A. Watson & Ronald G. Downing,
support their ideological views. In
contrast, the lawyers on nominat-
ing commissions have an interest in
supporting "judges who they believe
will lean toward the kinds of clients
the lawyers regularly represent in
court."76
The lay members of the com-
mission may also have particular
interests to pursue. Sometimes the
politics is among different constitu-
encies in the legal profession, each
vying for seats on the commissions
to sway the process in their favor.
Where these members are appointed
by the governor, "they are likely to
support the governor's preferences
for judges;" 8 governors provide their
lay members with acceptable names
that subsequently appear on the final
list. 9 With governors dominating the
process, early observers of the Mis-
souri Plan argued forcefully that the
system had devolved into an appoint-
ment system. 0
At the end of the day, the impor-
tant question is whether merit
selection-or any of the other
systems-yields and retains judges
of significantly higher quality. It is
difficult to measure judicial quality.
It is a challenge to determine which
components should be emphasized
in the selection of "quality" can-
didates."' Early research showed
little evidence that the merit plan
selected more qualified judges than
the other selection systems.12 One
scholar noted that "the popular prej-
udice against election as a system
producing poorly trained officials is
THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL
SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NON-PARTI-
SAN COURT PLAN (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &
Sons. 1969). In response to this problem, some
states have adopted district-based election
systems for members of the bar to choose their
own representatives. Stith & Root, Mo. L. REV.,
(2009).
77. Supra n. 5, at 84.
78. Id., at 85.
79. Alan Ashman & James J. Alfini, THE KEY
TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING
PROCESS (American Judicature Society, 1974).
80. Supra n. 76.
81. Supra n. 19.
82. Bradley C. Cannon, The Impact of Formal
Selection Processes on the Characteristics of
Judges-Reconsidered, LAw & Soc'Y REV. (1972);
Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Dif-
ference Does Method of judicial Selection Make?
Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last
Resort, 5 JUSTICE SYST. J. (1979).
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unfounded."" Subsequent research
seems to confirm that the quality of
judges on the bench varies little by
selection system. Judicial discipline
commissions do not sanction elected
judges more often than appointed
or merit plan judges. 4 A study com-
paring the perceived quality of legal
liability systems finds that partisan
elections yield poorer results than
other systems."' But a study evalu-
ating the opinions of state supreme
courts found that while appointed
judges write opinions that are cited
more often, elected judges write
more opinions overall; the authors
conclude that "the large quantity
differences makes up for the small
quality difference.""6
Perhaps the most common proxy
measure for judicial quality is previ-
ous judicial experience. Having some
previous judicial experience may be
an important predictor of quality
since the job of the judge is highly
technical and requires a great deal
of academic and practical knowl-
edge about the law. On state supreme
courts, the majority of judges have at
least some previous judicial experi-
ence on the bench." Evidence about
whether voters are influenced by a
candidate's previous judicial experi-
ence is mixed. One early study found
evidence of this influence in nonpar-
tisan trial court elections;"' another
study of nonpartisan supreme court
elections found no such evidence. 9 A
more recent study, which controls for
election effects, demonstrates that
previous judicial experience helps
predict outcomes in state supreme
court elections.90
On balance, it is difficult to con-
83. Herbert Jacob, The Effect of Institutional
Differences in the Recruitment Process: The Case
ofStateJudges, 13 J. OF PUBLIC L. 104, 109 (1964).
84. Supra n. 72.
85. Russell S. Sobel & Joshua C. Hall, The
Effect of Judicial Selection Process on judicial
Quality: The Role of Partisan Politics, 27 CATO
J. 69(2007).
86. Supra n. 38, at 290.
87. Carp, et al., JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA.
2014. However, as of 2000, 28 percent of state
supreme court judges had no previous judicial
experience.
88. Philip L. Dubois, Voting Cues in Nonparti-
san Trial Court Elections: A Multivariate Assess-
ment, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 395(1984).
89. David Klien & Lawrence Baum, Ballot
clude that these judicial selection
systems are substantially differ-
ent from each other in terms of the
quality of judges they yield. Although
the merit plan features a nomina-
tion committee tailored to maximize
judicial quality, given current mea-
sures of quality, this system does not
produce measurably better judges
than those systems without such
a feature. A big part of the problem
is the fact that we have been unable
to decide on a quantifiable metric
of what constitutes a high-quality
judge.9'
The studies presented here do not
speak directly to the ability of the
various systems to remove judges
who fail to meet the basic stan-
dards of competence. Judges who
face retention elections report that
these do encourage improvement,
and that maintaining competency
is the key to being retained." While
it is important to weed out as many
incompetent judges as possible at
the initial selection stage, judicial
selection systems must also foster
an accountability mechanism that is
strong enough to remove those who
do make it to the bench." The com-
parative performance of the judicial
selection systems on this metric
has not been well established in the
empirical literature and should be a
focus for the future.
Decision Outcomes and Trends
One of the major disagreements
between reformers and those who
support judicial elections has been
the propriety of holding judges
accountable for the popularity or
policy content of their decisions. The
Information and Voting Decisions in Judicial Elec-
tions, 54 PouLr. RES. Q. 709 (2001).
90. Supra n. 2.
91. Supra n. 27.
92. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retetn-
tion Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICA-
TURE 306 (1994).
93. Supra n. 27.
94. Supra n. 14.
95. Richard A. Posner, How JUDGES THINK
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
2010).
96. Supra n. 5.
97. Supra n. 17.
98. Rachel Paine Caufield, The Curious Logic
ofJudicial Elections, 64 ARK. L. REv. 249(2011).
99. Supra n. 2.
merit system implies a restrained
judicial role, where judges strive to
be neutral arbiters of existing poli-
cies.9 4 Inspired by the legal realists,
judicial behavior researchers have
long accepted the idea that judges
have significant discretion, and that
the zone in which strict legalism
survives is quite small.95 They argue
that who is on the bench has impor-
tant implications for the policymak-
ing in our court system.96
Research suggests that American
citizens are also starting to think of
judges as policy makers in their own
right." Reformers acknowledge the
policymaking role of judges but also
argue that judges should be held
accountable for the quality of their
performance and not for the policy
content of their decisions." So,
while there is a broad consensus on
the importance of maximizing judi-
cial quality through selection and
retention efforts, there is no corre-
sponding consensus over whether it
is desirable to hold judges account-
able for their policy preferences.
This is an important question,
and it is largely a normative one.
In order to win the debate on this
account, reformers will need to
change public perceptions about
the desirability of holding judges
accountable for policy positions.
Reformers intended that the merit
plan would provide accountability
for issues of judicial quality while
protecting independence on matters
of case outcomes and policy-related
matters. How well it does this is
an empirical question, and recent
research gives some important
insight on how each of the judicial
selection systems performs in terms
of promoting accountability.
Contestation by a quality candidate
is an important way that elections
allow citizens to hold judges account-
able.9 Retention elections do not
provide any contestation; similarly,
a good portion of the incumbency
advantage in judicial elections stems
from the lack of challengers. Unlike
merit system judges who can actually
lose their seats in uncontested elec-
tions, most elected judges who run
unopposed are guaranteed victory
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regardless of their vote share. 00
Low rates of contestation may
come from some "unwritten legal
custom [that] brands the activity
as improper."0 1 Practicing lawyers
may be unwilling to challenge a
sitting judge for professional and
practical reasons. But contesta-
tion rates in state supreme court
elections have risen such that most
incumbent judges seeking reelection
will face a challenger.'02 Statewide
partisan races seem to be the most
effective at attracting challeng-
ers.' This may be especially true in
states that are not dominated by a
single political party.' 4 Challengers
do act strategically when deciding
whether to run for judge; vulner-
able incumbents are the most likely
to draw challengers.' This helps to
enable voters to hold the weakest
judges accountable.
Another important way to
measure the ability of elections to
promote accountability is to consider
ballot roll-off. This is the percent-
age of voters in the top of ticket race
who fail to cast a ballot in the judi-
cial race. Although ballot roll-off in
retention elections has declined over
time, about a third of voters still fail
to vote at the bottom of the ticket.1 06
This is quite a bit higher than in other
types of judicial elections. Research
suggests that the presence of compe-
tition and a party label both reduce
roll-off significantly in state supreme
court0 7 and intermediate appel-
late court races."0 Partisan elec-
tions increase voter participation,
and increase accountability for the
quality of service, policy positions,
or both.
North Carolina recently moved
from partisan to nonpartisan elec-
tions, and there was a significant
increase in ballot roll-off after the
change, indicating a decline in voter
participation.' 9 One of the reasons
voters cite for failing to vote in judi-
cial elections is a lack of informa-
tion about the candidates. In order
for elections to serve their account-
ability purposes, voters must have
enough relevant information about
the candidate or candidates. The
little information that existed in the
past came from local newspapers.")
Nonpartisan judicial elections
receive less newspaper coverage
than do the top-billed races, and,
where there is coverage, it is less
helpful to voters."' The coverage
does not include the high-informa-
tion cues that voters need to make
decisions.10 2 In this regard, nonparti-
san judicial campaigns are more like
the other bottom of ticket races.13
Political parties are involved in many
aspects of nonpartisan judicial elec-
tions,"4 and this involvement can
sometimes help voters guess the
party affiliation of the candidates.
Indeed, candidates in nonpartisan
elections see political parties as an
important component of their cam-
paign and fundraising strategies."0s
100. Montana is the exception to this rule. In
1973, the state changed its election law to make
uncontested elections into retention elections,
putting incumbents at risk of defeat even when
unopposed.
101. Supra n. 5, at 78.
102. Supra n. 28.
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In partisan elections with more
high-quality cues available to voters,
voters with limited political knowl-
edge vote in higher numbers." 6
The presence of the party label on
the ballot is one of the most helpful
heuristic devices and the single most
salient cue that helps voters distin-
guish among candidates, judicial or
otherwise."' One of the important
similarities between nonpartisan
elections and retention elections
is the lack of a party label on the
ballot. Indeed, the desire to keep
party politics out of the selection
process was the impetus for both of
these reforms. Where the party label
is absent, there is some evidence
that voters will rely on subtle party
cues."0 Information about ideology
Diascro, Judicial Elections in the News, in
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TIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007).
111. Id.
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286(2002).
116. Supra n. 89.
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Press. 1980); Supra n. 2.
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or endorsements from politicians or
interest groups can serve as a proxy
for political party."is
Relying on the party label as a voter
cue is not an ideal answer to low voter
information. It is clear that the party
label helps voters make reasonable
assumptions about the policy stance
of the judge. Removing party labels
removes information, but keeping
party labels diminishes the relative
importance of judicial performance
and fitness. There is no clear answer,
and judicial reformers and social sci-
entists need to continue exploring
voting behavior as it relates to the
goals of reform.
Voter information guides have
been promoted as a way to combat
the information problem, but such
guides are not a solution. Voters in
many states already have access to
such guides. Interest groups often
produce the guides, and reliable ones
often come from nonpartisan legal
reform groups.12 0 Thus far, evidence
suggests that voters fail to utilize
this kind of information when it is
available.'2 1 Such guides do not help,
but they do not hurt either.
One problematic version of a voter
guide is the publication of recommen-
dations from state-sponsored judi-
cial evaluation committees. These
publications typically provide a nar-
rative assessment of the judge's per-
formance on the bench, along with
a recommendation about whether
119.Supra n. 110.
120. Deborah Goldberg, Interest Group Partici-
pation in Judicial Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE:
THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb
ed. 2007).
121. Supra n. 2.
122. Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention
Evaluation Programs, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1375
(2000).
123. G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections
Work?, 74 Mo. L. REV. 605(2009).
124. Rebecca D. Gill, Judicial Performance
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(2012);Rebecca D. Gill, et al., Are judicial Perfor-
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L. & Soc'Y REv. 731(2011).
125. Rachel Paine Caufield, The Changing Tone
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in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL,
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TIONs 35, (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007).
126. Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum,
voters should retain the judge.
Although judicial performance evalu-
ations have an important place in the
promotion of judicial self-improve-
ment,122 the distribution of the
results in the name of voter informa-
tion essentially amounts to campaign
propaganda coming directly from
the state. 1 In addition, research
has identified evidence of significant
problems of gender and race bias
in the attorney survey results that
feature prominently in the commit-
tee recommendations.124
The lack of voter information
seems to lead to the dismal voter
participation rates in judicial elec-
tions. Partisan elections tend to do
better at engaging the voters, but
the presence of the party label on
the ballot entices voters to evaluate
judges based on the political for-
tunes of their co-partisans in govern-
ment rather than on the judges' own
merits. Informing the voters will
not be as simple as providing voter
guides, either. Government spon-
sorship of such guides is ethically
problematic. We need to put a lot of
thought into devising a solution to
this information problem.
Judicial Election Campaigns
At present, the one real mechanism
filling the information gap is the judi-
cial campaign. For a slew of reasons,
these have traditionally been very
low-profile affairs. Judges avoided
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campaigning, save for the occa-
sional public appearance, graduation
speech, and the like. Some of this may
be a matter of judicial culture, but it
is also true that "judicial candidates
have been restricted in what they
can say on the campaign trail" as a
matter of both the judicial ethical
canons and the laws of the various
states.' Such rules and laws have
targeted what have been called high-
information cues like issue positions
or ideology,"6 leaving voters with
precious little information.
Changes are afoot. A "new-style"
judicial campaign has permeated all
types of judicial elections, mimick-
ing other elections.1 7 State courts
are more important players in the
American legal landscape than they
once were."8 The recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White12 1 invalidated some
restrictions on judicial campaign
activities. The post-White freedom of
judicial candidates to announce their
positions on controversial issues
raises a related problem. Although
"active politicking by judges" used
to be "regarded as demeaning,""'o
there is some fear that the White deci-
sion will unleash a flurry of naked
partisanship into judicial election
campaigns."' This is especially dis-
concerting since the decision in White
called into question the constitution-
ality of a number of other special reg-
ulations for judicial elections.' 3 '
Yet, experimental evidence sug-
gests "even promises to decide
cases in specific ways have no con-
sequences at all for the legitimacy
of the institution.""' Despite being
given the green light by the Supreme
Court to announce positions, judges
are not particularly interested in
taking advantage of this freedom.3 4
It seems likely that the bigger threat
to the legitimacy of the courts will
come from the proliferation of attack
ads, as well as the money needed
to wage the large-scale advertising
campaigns necessary to secure or
protect judgeships today. The rise of
television advertising has no doubt
precipitated this problem, as it "has
multiplied the cost of campaign-
ing and made defamation a central
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feature of the activity."'3 5 The fear is
that the use of attack ads will dimin-
ish the public perception that the
judicial candidates are apolitical.
The concern about attack ads is
not unfounded. There is evidence
that attack ads can cause some
damage to the institutional legiti-
macy of state supreme courts, just as
they damage the legitimacy of state
legislatures."' This is particularly
problematic when the ads are spon-
sored by someone other than one of
the candidates on the ballot, as they
usually are."' "The campaigns paid
for by independent expenditures in
recent years have often amounted to
rank character assassination against
sitting judges.""' Attacks from
special interests are often ambush
attacks; unlike challengers in elec-
tions, outside interest groups do not
need to declare their candidacy by a
particular date.'"' Instead, they can
swoop in at the last minute when the
judge has no chance of mounting a
counter attack before the election.
The problem may be even more
serious in retention and nonpartisan
elections. The party label is a high-
quality information cue that tends
to trump any case- or judge-specific
information that voters hear in an
advertising campaign.140 In reten-
tion elections, where the incumbent
judge faces no competitor but still
stands a chance of losing the seat, the
need to assemble a fundraising strat-
egy may not become apparent until it
is far too late.
As spending on television ads con-
tinued its meteoric rise in 2010,141
it seems that the Supreme Court's
decision in White may have had some
effect on the content of campaign
advertising in judicial elections. It is
not yet clear that it has led to more
attack ads. Although states that
interpreted White broadly had more
ads drawing distinctions between
candidates, the number of attack
ads was not significantly different
even though almost two-thirds of
the attack ads on the airwaves come
from independent expenditures by
political parties or other groups.14
The ads paid for by these indepen-
dent expenditures-often funded
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by groups outside the state-have
tended to be particularly nasty and
damaging.14 1
The intuitive reaction to the
increased cost of judicial campaigns
is concern that the influx of money
into these races will damage the
independence of the judiciary and
the appearance of judicial impar-
tiality The fear is that as campaign
contributions become more neces-
sary, judicial candidates will need to
do more to attract donors and ever
higher sums of money This could
keep judges beholden to the cam-
paign donors who helped them get
on or stay on the bench. At the very
least, the high cost of these cam-
paigns may create the appearance
that the courts are no longer staffed
with independent judges. Experi-
mental evidence confirms that this
can damage the legitimacy of the
courts as institutions. 4 4
The chances of any particular
state supreme court candidate suc-
ceeding in an election is closely
tied to that candidate's campaign
expenditures' 4 1 Partisan races are
more expensive than nonpartisan
ones,146 but recent evidence suggests
that nonpartisan races are actu-
ally more expensive than partisan
elections after controlling for the
factors that significantly influence
candidate spending.47  The most
expensive races are those in states
with supreme courts that are closely
divided on party or ideological
lines-most notably Illinois, Michi-
135. Supra n. 21, at 81.
136. Supra n. 17.
137. Supra n. 134.
138. Id., at 2.
139. Supra n. 123.
140. Supra n. 57.
141. Supra n. 134. Upwards of $12 million was
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gan, and Pennsylvania.148 Political
parties are often heavily involved
in raising money and coordinating
fundraising efforts for judicial cam-
paigns, even in nonpartisan races. 4 1
Lawyers continue to lead the
charge in terms of campaign contri-
butions to judicial candidates.s' It is
often assumed that the increased role
of lawyers in the process of select-
ing judges "suggests a correspond-
ing decline in the power of political
parties, voters, and other compet-
ing groups that represent the idea of
popular political culture in the judi-
ciary.""' A number of studies have
found a connection between cam-
paign contributions from lawyers
and later judicial decisions favorable
to these contributing lawyers. Such
a correlation has been established
in tort cases"' and arbitration deci-
sions,' although other studies have
failed to find evidence of a relation-
ship. " 4
The causal link between cam-
paign contributions and decisions
is difficult to establish, as strategic
campaign donors will choose to con-
tribute to judges they think likely to
support their interests to begin with.
Some recent single-state studies deal
with this problem, and they find some
evidence that contributions and deci-
sions are linked causally." However,
a broader study finds mixed results,
with only one of three states inves-
tigated showing "evidence of correla-
tion and suggestions of causality."s 6
The increases in campaign spend-
ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed. 2007).
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ing, especially independent expendi-
tures, seem to disadvantage judges
facing retention elections most of all.
Few judges standing for retention
elections solicit copious campaign
contributions; retention elections are
usually quite inexpensive. Candidate
fundraising is higher in contested
elections, so judges in contested
elections are more likely to have the
means to fight back against interest
group campaigns.
Interest groups have long recog-
nized that retention elections provide
an opportunity to remove judges
unfriendly to their policy goals.'
On occasion, merit plan judges have
amassed significant war chests to
combat these attacks,"" sometimes
just in anticipation of such attacks.
But even when merit plan judges
raise little money, they often do
find ways to combat interest group-
sponsored "vote no" campaigns. For
example, although the three Iowa
justices who were unseated in the
2010 elections raised no money of
their own, the "vote yes" group, Fair
Courts for Us, spent nearly $400,000
in independent expenditures in an
attempt to counter the attack. The
failure of this group to save the jobs
of the three incumbent judges is only
partially attributable to their having
been significantly outspent; as a
recent Justice at Stake report admits,
the group "struggled to gain trac-
tion in a state where anger over the
court's ruling on same-sex marriage
remained intense."' 59
Higher levels of candidate spend-
ing in state supreme court elec-
tions may decrease the legitimacy
of courts; it also serves to increase
voter participation in those races.
As voters gain more informa-
156. Damon M. Cann, et al., Campaign Contribu-
tions and judicial Decisions in Partisan and Non-
partisan Elections, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN JUDICIAL
PoLITIcs 50, (Kevin T. McGuire ed. 2012).
157. Supra n 76.
158. Michael B. Dann & Randall M. Hansen,
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1429 (2001).
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161. James L. Gibson, Nastier, Noisier, Cost-
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and Serves justice, MILLER-MCCUNE August.
2008.
THE SITUATION IS NOT HOPELESS,
AND THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE DOES
NOT REQUIRE A DIRE CONCLUSION.
THE RELATIVE MERIT OF THE VARIOUS
SYSTEMS DEPENDS ON THE GOALS
WE WISH TO MAXIMIZE.
tion through the fruits of cam-
paign expenditures, they become
more likely to cast a vote in these
elections. 6 o This may serve to
strengthen the democratic link
between the citizens and their state
court judges, thereby mitigating
some of the damage to legitimacy.""
It is clear that much of the increase
in spending is driven by the need
for incumbent judges to counter
the aggressive advertising cam-
paigns mounted through indepen-
dent expenditures.1 62 Today's threat
of politicization of the campaigns
comes not from the parties, but
from outside interest groups, 6 and
retention elections do not seem to
be immune to these threats. There
is reason to suspect that the trend
toward ever-increasing expendi-
tures from outside interests will
continue, especially in the wake of
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Citizens United,'64 which held restric-
tions on electioneering communica-
162. Supra n. 134.
163. Supra n. 123.
164. Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission, 558 U.S. 310.
165. Supra n. 134.
166. Supra n. 17.
167. Supra n. 14.
168. Supra n. 120; Charles M. Cameron, et
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SCIENCE REVIEw 525(1990);Jeffery A. Segal, et
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tions by corporations and unions
unconstitutional.
In judicial elections, the sources of
money for these independent adver-
tising campaigns are often hidden.
Although the Court in Citizens United
stressed the need to promote trans-
parency in the money trail for these
types of expenditures, states have
been slow to implement the robust
disclosure systems necessary to
keep track of who is paying for
what.6 s This is a particularly prom-
ising avenue for improving judicial
elections of all types, and reformers
should push for commonsense legis-
lation in those states that continue to
drag their feet.
Even if the public does not see
campaign finance issues to be more
problematic for judges as compared
with legislators,"' there is good
reason to be more vigilant when
it comes to campaign donations to
judges. The legislator's role is to
respond to the needs of constitu-
ents, but the "rule of law interposes
legal text between the choices judges
make and the public preferences."1 6 7
It is not clear that even eliminating
judicial elections altogether would
remove the problem of interest group
influence; the experience of recent
federal appellate nominees shows
that even appointment systems are
also heavily influenced by interest
groups.168
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Diversity on the Bench
The discussion of selection systems
and spending ignores another com-
ponent of legitimacy. The presence
of nontraditional judges can help to
build public support and confidence
in our courts. As U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg put it,
"[a] system of justice is the richer
for the diversity of background and
experience of its participants."6 9 It
is important to understand the effect
different judicial selection systems
have on the diversity of the judi-
ciary, then, if we wish to understand
fully the components of institutional
legitimacy. Because of differences
in the constituencies involved in
the selection processes, we need to
know whether "different selection
systems establish varying informal
requirements for office, give access
to different groups, [or] grant special
advantages to some aspirants." 70
Although the situation has
improved significantly, women
and minorities are still underrep-
resented in our state judiciaries.
Today, nearly a third of lawyers are
women; this percentage is likely to
go up, given that men and women
are about equally represented in
America's law schools."' As of 2012,
there were a total of 4,711 female
judges serving on American state
courts-27 percent of the total; 7 2 the
American Bar Association reports
that members of minority racial and
ethnic groups constitute just over
12 percent of the judges on the state
courts. 7 1
Reformers had high hopes that the
merit plan would encourage diver-
sity by allowing candidates to side-
step traditional barriers to entry
into the profession and stand on
their qualifications alone.' Evidence
linking particular judicial selection
methods to increased diversifica-
tion of the bench is mixed.'7 5 Some
research suggests that it is varia-
tion in the diversity of the legal pro-
fession and not the type of judicial
selection system that drives the rep-
resentation of women and minorities
on state benches.'7 6 A recent study
of contested intermediate appellate
court races found that there was no
systematic bias against female can-
didates in these elections."' Early
research suggests that elective
systems were associated with higher
rates of female and minority judges
in the 1980s, but that these differ-
ences had evaporated by the end of
the century.7
When there is an all-male state
supreme court bench, however, the
story changes a bit. Research sug-
gests that, in this situation, appoint-
ment-based systems, including merit
plan appointments, are more likely
to place a woman on that bench.'7
This may be a result of the tendency
of governors to make symbolic
appointments to the bench, at least
in part because such appointments
can serve as "opportunities to hold
political coalitions together and to
reinforce group support for particu-
lar parties and candidates."' Gov-
ernors, legislatures, and nominating
commissions are also in a better
position to coordinate the elevation
of the first woman or minority to a
bench than are voters, who do not
get an opportunity to strategize in
pursuit of such goals.
The Future of Judicial Selection
As this article demonstrates, there
is no one best system for selecting
judges. Reformers have long been
chasing the ideal, hoping to find
a way to balance accountability
and independence while increas-
ing the quality (and more recently
the diversity) of the bench. At each
stage, however, the high expecta-
tions of reformers have led to disap-
pointment in the modest results of
the reforms.'' This does not mean
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(2003).
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Diversity, 48 THE JUDGES' JOURNAL 1 (2009).
176. Nicholas 0. Alozie, Distribution of Women
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partisan elections are superior or
preferable. On the contrary, current
empirical evidence simply shows
the difficulty in escaping the prob-
lems inherent in partisan elections.
Nonpartisan and retention elections
are coming to look more and more
like the partisan elections they were
meant to improve upon. Appoint-
ment-based systems have their own
problems; at least some of the lack of
independence from the political elite
that caused reformers to move away
from the system in the nineteenth
century remains today.
The situation is not hopeless, and
the empirical evidence does not
require a dire conclusion. The rela-
tive merit of the various systems
depends on the goals we wish to
maximize. Decades of research
attempts to find significant differ-
ences between the systems, but what
we have ended up with is evidence
that is mixed at best. However, we
do have evidence about how each of
these systems works in practice and
which goal each favors.
The elimination of contested judi-
cial elections in favor of merit selec-
tion remains one of the most popular
reform proposals. The list of orga-
nizations supporting the elimina-
tion of judicial elections is long. It
includes such prestigious groups as
the American Bar Association, the
American Judicature Society, the
National Center for State Courts,
the Institute for the Advancement of
the American Legal System, Justice
at Stake, the Brennan Center, and
more. It seems, however, that move-
ment toward merit selection has lost
its momentum. A majority of Ameri-
Selection Methods, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 315(1990).
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can citizens today thinks that judges
ought to be elected. This makes it
difficult to achieve the electoral
majorities needed to abandon elec-
tions. As such, a reform strategy that
focuses single-mindedly on adopting
the merit plan is probably doomed to
failure in today's political climate.'
A move to nonpartisan elections, the
American Bar Association's second
choice reform,"" is probably more
feasible politically, but the evidence
does not show that this would fix the
most pressing problems.
Short of eliminating judicial elec-
tions altogether, a number of other
reforms have been proposed. These
reforms all seek to combat the major
shortcomings of the existing judicial
selection systems. This is likely a
more promising avenue for address-
ing the specific problems that social
scientists have identified. While
the specific reforms vary in terms
of their usefulness, they all attempt
to provide creative solutions short
of making costly and controversial
overhauls in the system of judicial
selection. Instead, these reforms are
adjustments to the existing systems.
As this article emphasizes, the
most pressing problem with judi-
cial selection in the American states
involves the conduct and financing
of judicial campaigns. Campaigns
serve the important task of provid-
ing information to voters, but the
cost of these campaigns has soared
out of control, placing enormous
pressure on judicial candidates to
assemble huge stockpiles of cam-
paign donations. Campaign rheto-
ric has gotten nasty. Much of this is
due to the ability of outside groups
to use independent expenditures to
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conduct virtually anonymous attack
ad campaigns against candidates in
all kinds of judicial elections. Voters
are troubled by this, and with good
reason.
The American Bar Association,
among other groups, has pushed
for the public financing of judicial
elections. Even strong supporters
of judicial elections have favored
well-designed public financing pro-
grams.8 " One promising example
of such a system has recently been
implemented in North Carolina.'
Spending decreased in appellate
court races since the new system was
implemented, and a large proportion
of judicial candidates are participat-
ing in the program.186
The consequences of having
an underfunded public financing
system are being felt in Wiscon-
sin, where few candidates bother to
participate in the system.'e Lack of
funding undermines the purpose of
the system and does little to reduce
the disparity in campaign spending
between candidates. Limiting the
fundraising abilities of candidates
could make the independent expen-
ditures even more powerful, 8s given
that it is relative spending that seems
to drive the effects of spending on
electoral success."' Some limits
could also increase the incumbency
advantage, since challengers usually
need to spend more than incum-
bents.
One of the more promising com-
ponents of North Carolina's system
was the provision of rescue funds
for candidates who accept public
financing and face opponents who
have outspent the public financing
limits. This could have mitigated
both the incumbency advantage
and the related problem of spend-
ing disparities,' but the Supreme
Court in Arizona Free Enterprise Club
v. Bennett'' invalidated a similar
rescue-funds scheme. Even had it
been upheld, the provision would not
have mitigated the relative increase
in influence of independent expen-
ditures. With state governments
facing record budgetary shortfalls,
there is little political will to commit
adequate funding for such a system.
North Carolina's system is funded
by voluntary donations, and this is
working well so far; however, the
proportion of taxpayers, lawyers,
and businesses currently contribut-
ing is worryingly low.
A majority of Americans are con-
cerned about threats to the impar-
tiality of our courts, but they are
unwilling to go as far as giving up
their right to participate in the selec-
tion process via popular elections.
Perhaps the most promising reform
is the development of creative public
financing systems for judicial cam-
paigns. Another high priority is
rigorous disclosure systems for
campaign donations and indepen-
dent expenditures. Together, these
reforms can address the major con-
cerns about judicial independence
without forcing states to abandon
the competitive elections the public
seems to favor.
As with all such reforms, it will be
necessary to develop well-crafted
policies that set up appropriate
incentives for all who are involved in
the process. It will also be necessary
to hold costs down. If scholars, practi-
tioners, and reformers work together
to build smart fixes to the problems
identified in the literature, it is my
sincere belief that we can mitigate
some of the most pressing problems.
Instead of pursuing ambitious over-
hauls, we should focus our efforts
on practical adaptations of existing
judicial selection institutions. I do
not believe that this requires across-
the-board agreement on which
system is the best; instead, we can
put our heads together to make each
of these existing systems the best
they can be. *
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Charles Ruggles donates $40,000 to support
the Society
1914 Bulietins1-vI
rise to the Citizen's Conferences
First National Conference on Judicial
Retirement and Disability Commissions,
later becoming Conference on Judicial
1973 First education
commissioners
Model Bar Association Act is published in
thejournal
1974 7 cia! Merit Selectio)
ocess is published
Bulletin XIV,
is published
courts and justice is hE
ues support for
1977 President Carter implements a nominating
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The Society is reorganized; readers of
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1929
1990 National program for Reporting on the
Courts and the Law is held at a number of
locations around the country, including
1991 Elmo B. Hunter Center for Judicial Selection
is formed
1992/1993 Annual Citizens Conferences on
Merit Selection - 2nd in Hawaii
1994 Model Provisions for Judicial Selection is
revised
1997 National Symposium on Sentencing
1997 Forum "Improving Access to the Courts for
People Who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing"
held in Miami, Chicago, and other locations
1997 Center for Judicial Independence is formed
Issues is held in Scottsdale, Arizona. AJS
partners with State Justice Institute and
Open Society
2003 National Conference on Preventing
Conviction of Innocent Persons
2003 AJS Moves Headquarters to the Opperman
Center at Drake University in Des Moines,
Iowa
2006 Center for Forensic Sciences and Public
Policy formed, located in Greensboro, NC
2007/2008 Judicial Selection in the States
website is launched
2011 Report on the National Eye-Witness
Identification Field Studies is released
2012 JNCSurvey is published
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